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A Model Central Bank?
Despite the recent slowdown associated with
appreciation of the yen exchange rate, japan's
overa.1I ma.croeconomic performance during the
last decade has been impressive (Chart 1). Real
GNP in japan has averaged a robust 4.3 percent
since 1975, while inflation (GNP deflator) has
averaged less than 4 percent. Comparable fig-
ures for the United States are 2.5 percent GNP
growth and 6.9 percent average inflation.
Moreover, japan alone among the major indus-
trial countries was able to maintain strong out-
put growth while avoiding the continual
inflationary pressures that followed the second
oil price shock in 1979. The U.S. eventually also
reduced inflation after the second oil price
shock, but only after undergoing a severe reces-
sion in 1981-1982. In fact, the volatility (stan-
dard deviation divided by average growth) of
u.s. real GNP growth since 1980 has been more
than six ti'mes greater than that ofjapan.
One frequently cited explanation for japan's suc-
cessful macroeconomic performance focuses on
japanese monetary policy. Several prominent
economists have argued that the Bank of japan
(BOj) - japan's central bank - undertook a
major policy shift in the mid-1970s that created
the conditions necessary to attain an environ-
ment of low inflation and stable output growth.
At least two views regarding the nature of this
policy shift may be distinguished. Milton Fried-
man argues that "The Bank of japan has been
the least monetarist central bank in its rhetoric,
the most monetarist in its policy". Allan Meltzer
has characterized japan's shift in monetary
regimes in terms of the adoption of a more
"credible" monetary policy. By credible,
Meltzer means that Bank ofjapan policy has
become more predictable, that is, can be pre-
dicted with less forecast error. This Letter evalu-
ates the evidence supporting these two views.
Monetarist principles?
A central theme of monetarism is that achieving
a low and stable rate of growth in a basic money
aggregate is a necessary condition for a central
bank to achieve a low rate of price inflation and
stable output growth. Some monetarists have
recommended that a constant money growth
objective be pursued. To achieve money growth
targets, monetarists usually argue that the central
bank should operate to control strictly growth in
either total bank reserves or the monetary base
(total bank reserves plus currency in circulation
outside banks). In particular, Milton Friedman
states that "monetary \authorities should avoid
trying to manipulate either interest rates or
exchange rates" because an interest rate or an
exchange rate operating procedure is inconsis-
tent with the objective of monetary control.
Friedman's evidence for concluding that the
Bank of japan is following monetarist principles
is based primarily on two facts: japan's rate of
money growth (broad money defined as M2 plus
certificates of deposit) has followed a fairly
steady trend ofdecline since the mid-1970s, and
this trend has coincided with a decline in the
rate of japanese price inflation.
Although japanese money growth remains high
by international standards, Chart 2 shows a
declining trend from the peak reached in 1975
through 1983, at which time money growth
appears to have stabilized at roughly 8 percent
per annum. Similarly, japanese inflation reached
a peak in 1974-1975, trended downwards until
1983, and has since fluctuated within the 0-2.5
percent range. In addition, the growth in jap-
anese broad money - the BOYs intermediate
indicator - has been less volatile than growth
in the U.S. narrow money aggregate (M1).
However, growth in the japanese narrow money
aggregate - usually preferred by monetarists as.FRBSF
an intermediate target of policy - has been
considerably more volatile than its U.S. counter-
part. Moreover, the Bank ofJapan also has not
ach~evedthe decline in money growth by fol-
lowln~ monetary control procedures typically
prescribed by monetarists. The BOj's primary
short-term operating instrument is the interbank
interest rate (call loans and discounted commer-
cial bills), and the Balik's moves to "smooth"
i~terbankinterest rates are at least partly respon-
sible for their stability in recent years. In fact,
Japanese interbank interest rates have shown
considerably less variability than the federal
funds rate in the u.s. (Chart 3).
It therefore seems inconsistent for monetarists to
criticize the interest rate operating instrument of
the Fed while lauding the operating control pro-
cedures ofthe BOJ. The HOJ has apparently
found the use of an interest rate operating instru-
ment compatible with a reasonably steady
deceleration in money growth and a low infla-
tion environment.
Also noteworthy in this context is that attempts
to control money growth as an explicit inter-
mediate target of policy have never been
embraced in Japan with the same enthusiasm as
in the U.S. by the Federal Reserve between
1979-1982. Since 1978, the BOJ has announced
"projections" of the annual rate of broad money
growth for four quarters ending one quarter
ahead. The information imbedded in its money
projections therefore amounts to one-quarter
ahead forecasts of money growth that, on bal-
ance, have been fairly accurate.
The projections do not, however serve as a
guide to the intermediate or longer term policy
st.a~ceof the BOJ and, in fact, have varied sig-
nrflcantly (between 6.5 and 12.5 percent) since
the anno~ncements began in 1978. Moreover,
by ~eportlng new growth projections each quar-
ter Independent of deviations from previous pro-
jects, the BOJ in essence allows complete "base
drift" - a practice monetarists criticize the Fed
for pursuing.
"Credibility" and predictability
Allan Meltzer also attributes the seemingly more
!avorable output/inflation tradeoff experienced
In J~pan to substantive differences in monetary
policy. However, he recognizes the BOYs clear
deviation from traditional monetarist principles
and argues instead that Japan's relative success
is attributable to the greater consistency - or
greater predictability - of its monetary policy.
Greater predictability, according to Meltzer,
makes the BOJ more "credible" than the Fed
and greater credibility has resulted in Japan's'
experience of disinflation without recession.
Meltzer's argument derives from the principles
of the so-called "new classical" macroeco-
nomics. This school of economic thought argues
that only monetary policy "surprises" (e.g.,
unpredictable and therefore unexpected pol-
icies) have an impact on real output. In this
view, if money growth were predictable, and
therefore could be anticipated, monetary policy
should have no influence on real output.
The basic reasoning behind this theory is that
real output in the economy is fundamentally
determined by such "real" factors as labor pro-
ductivity, labor/leisure choice, technology, and
r~source endo",:ments. Money is a nominal mag-
nlt~de t~at has Inflation consequences, but
which, In an equilibrium setting with price flex-
ibility, has no impact on fundamental real fac-
tors and therefore on output.
According to this view, only when unanticipated
money causes unanticipated inflation will mone-
tary policy have even temporary effects on out-
put. These effects would result from firms that
i~crease their output in response to what they
view as a favorable relative price shift rather
t~an. what in fact amounts to an economy-wide
rise In the general price level. Once they realize
that costs as well as all other prices in the econ-
omy have increased proportionately with their
own product price, they will cut production
back to the original "natural" output level.
Applying the newclassical theory to Japan,
Meltzer suggests that 1) a highly predictable BOJ
policy (i.e., one with few "surprises") has led to
t~e apparent independence of output from infla-
tion, and 2) that the overall decline in money
growth is responsible for lowJapanese inflation.
The .evide~c~ .marshalled by Meltzer in support
of hiS credibility thesis is that the forecast error
variance (generated from sophisticated forecast-
ing equations) of nominal GNP real GNP and
prices in Japan decreased mark~dly after the
country's switch to fluctuating exchange rates in
1971. Moreover, the forecast errors for these
variables were higher in the U.S. under fluctuat-
ing than under fixed exchange rates. Fewer sur-
prises in Japan and more surprises in the u.s.Percent
Nonetheless, Meltzer argues that greater output
and price stability in japan since 1971 has been
associated with increased Bank ofjapan "cred-
ibility" as opposed to a wide variety of other
potential explanations (e.g., differences in finan-
cial and labor market institutions, differences in
fiscal policy, and so on). As part ofthis thesis, he
also suggests that japan's introduction of pub-
licly announced quarterly money growth projec-
tions - which were not even initiated until the
third quarter of 1978 - contributed substan-
tially to a more stable environment following
japan's move to fluctuating exchange rates. He
does not, however, offer any direct empirical
evidence to support this view.
Conclusion
Support for either the "monetarist" view or the
"credibility" view of the reasons behind the
seemingly more favorable output/inflation trade-
off in japan compared to the u.s. seems rather
weak. Reaching a similar conclusion after ana-
lyzing the monetarist view, one observer has
noted that"... japan achieves results that are
monetarist in nature without using the pro-
cedures frequently advocated by monetarists." A
similar statement could be made about the cred-
ibility hypothesis: The Bank ofjapan achieves
results that are credible in nature without having
used more predictable policies.
lead Meltzer to conclude that the BOj must be
following a more credible monetary policy.
Given the limited empirical support for either
the monetarist or credibility hypothesis regard-
ing the Bank ofjapan's behavior, other explana-
tions for the japanese success in maintaining
stable output growth during the recent period of
disinflation should be explored.
The difficulty with this conclusion, as Meltzer
also points out, is that the variance of money
(M1) forecast errors for japan and the u.s. did
not decline after 1971 when forecast errors for
GNP and price did decline. Moreover, the vari-
ability of forecast errors for u.s. money growth
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 203,682 124 203 0.0
Loans and Leases1 6 182,766 - 1 - 1,580 - 0.8
Commercial and Industrial 53,593 143 115 0.2
Real estate 67,908 261 1,749 2.6
Loans to Individuals 37,153 56 - 3,094 - 7.6
Leases 5,460 6 - 192 - 3.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 13,821 98 2,787 25.2
Other Securities2 7,095 26 - 1,005 - 12.4
Total Deposits 208,398 - 1,442 6,373 3.1
Demand Deposits 52,821 - 1,481 4,913 10.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,272 303 3,522 10.7
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,561 - 278 4,172 27.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,015 316 - 2,713 - 1.9
Money MarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 46,718 261 890 1.9
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 32,517 103 - 6,007 - 15.5
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,440 - 387 - 3,622 - 13.3
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, SuperNOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RJ>s and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change